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Abstract
We introduce and discuss optimal control strategies for kinetic models for wealth dis-
tribution in a simple market economy, acting to minimize the variance of the wealth
density among the population. Our analysis is based on a finite time horizon ap-
proximation, or model predictive control, of the corresponding control problem for
the microscopic agents’ dynamic and results in an alternative theoretical approach
to the taxation and redistribution policy at a global level. It is shown that in gen-
eral the control is able to modify the Pareto index of the stationary solution of the
corresponding Boltzmann kinetic equation, and that this modification can be exactly
quantified. Connections between previous Fokker-Planck based models and taxation-
redistribution policies and the present approach are also discussed.
Keywords: Wealth distribution, wealth inequalities, kinetic models, optimal control,
finite time horizon, Fokker-Planck equations, Pareto tails, taxation, redistribution.
1 Introduction
Any society with a growing reliance on capital experiences an increasing concentration of
wealth, which leads in general to a marked social inequality. How to reduce these social
inequalities in capitalistic countries is a debated issue. The usual government policies are
to use proportional taxation, with the expectation that a progressive tax system would
prevent excess concentration of wealth. A recent approach to this relevant economic
question can be found in Piketty [26], whose main conviction is that the effect of the tax
on capital income is not only to reduce the total accumulation of wealth, but to modify
the structure of the wealth distribution over the long run. In other words, a confiscatory
tax on high incomes combined with a progressive tax on the value of the capital is viewed
by Piketty as the only way to prevent the natural tendency of capitalism to head towards
excessive inequality.
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As a matter of fact, long term predictions on economic systems are very difficult to
justify, and a serious debate would require a rigorous analysis based on well-established
models of wealth distribution. In this developing area of research, mathematical modeling
of economic systems has had interesting advances in recent years [14, 16, 17, 22].
Starting from the pioneering studies of Angle [4], most of these models sink their roots
into statistical mechanics [31, 27], and are based on methods borrowed from the kinetic
theory of rarefied gases and the Boltzmann equation [9, 10]. The main original motivation
at the basis of this modeling was to understand the possible reasons of formation of heavy
tails in the distribution of wealth, as predicted by the economic analysis of the Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto [24].
One of the kinetic models of wealth distribution able to reproduce the formation of
Pareto tails on the basis of few physically plausible hypotheses has been introduced in 2005
in [13]. There, the evolution of wealth has been based on binary trades modeled to include
the idea that wealth changes hands for a specific reason: one agent intends to invest their
wealth in some asset, property etc. in possession of their trade partner. Typically, such
investments bear some risk, and either provide the buyer with some additional wealth,
or lead to the loss of wealth in a non-deterministic way. An easy realisation of this idea
consists in coupling the saving propensity parameter [11, 12] with some risky investment
that yields an immediate gain or loss proportional to the current wealth of the investing
agent. Leaving the details of the microscopic trade to Section 2.2, we recall here that
the model for wealth distribution introduced in [13] revealed to be very flexible with
respect to the addition of further economic aspects, including the possibility of studying
the effects of taxation and redistribution [5, 6, 29], the role and consequences of the
addition of a parameter describing agent’s knowledge [23], and the possibility to use the
kinetic interaction operator to construct suitable equations of hydrodynamics [18, 30].
Going back to the problem of capitalistic societies and wealth inequality, it is interesting
to remark that the numerical simulation of the evolution of the kinetic model for wealth
and knowledge developed in [23], led to the conclusion that the unequal distribution of
knowledge in a multi-agent society is itself a cause of an unequal distribution of wealth
among agents. Other aspects of wealth inequality and surplus theory have been recently
analysed from the mathematical point of view [25], with the aim to to find a relationship
between agents’ risk aversion and inequality of incomes. These studies clearly outline the
importance of resorting to mathematical modeling to test and eventually verify economical
hypotheses.
In this paper, we will discuss a possible alternative to the standard taxation and
redistribution rules, which relies on a suitable control applied to the microscopic trades
describing the wealth distribution of the multi-agent system. Recent applications of control
problems to kinetic models with binary interactions describing opinion formation can be
found in [1, 2] (cf. also [3] for an exhaustive review). Indeed, the possibility to effectively
exercise a control on opinion and to evaluate the impact of modern communication systems,
like social networks, to the dynamics of opinions, is a challenging problem of increasing
importance.
More precisely, we assume the existence of a policy maker (a government or a local
administrator) that applies a suitable control process to each economic interaction with
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the aim to minimize a given cost functional measuring the wealth inequalities in the
system. This control acts as an agent dependent taxation/redistribution dynamic and,
for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed conservative over the whole set of agents so that
the total amount of wealth remains unchanged. The resulting constrained dynamic takes
the form of an optimal control problem which, for a large set of agents, turns out to
be computationally prohibitive due to its intrinsic complexity and therefore approximate
solution are sought even if suboptimal. Among various possible approaches here, following
[1, 2], we apply a finite time horizon strategy based on model predictive control. In the
simpler case of instantaneous control the problem can be solved explicitly giving rise to a
feedback control that can be embedded in the microscopic system.
By considering binary interactions, the application of this feedback control can be
shown to change the saving propensities of the agents, which induces a smaller variance
for the density of wealth of the population. For the binary dynamic introduced in [13] the
corresponding feedback control originates a Boltzmann equation whose stationary states,
compared to the original uncontrolled model, have a larger Pareto index. An explicit
result in the direction of Piketty’s opinion [26] is that, in the quasi-invariant interaction
limit, among others, we can recover the same Fokker–Planck equation resulting from a
standard taxation and redistribution process [5, 6].
The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
microscopic model in the optimal control setting. For this model we derive the explicit
feedback control in a finite time horizon approximation and focus on the binary interaction
case. Section 3 is devoted to the study of the corresponding kinetic models. We focus
on the CPT model [13] and show that the action of the control is capable to increase
the Pareto index of the corresponding wealth distribution, thereby reducing inequalities.
To have a further insight in the stationary states of the system, in Section 4 we pass to
the limit controlled Fokker-Planck equation and show how it can be reinterpreted as a
taxation-redistribution model. Some numerical simulations which confirm our analysis
are also reported.
2 Optimal control of wealth inequalities
2.1 A microscopic model with control
Let us consider the microscopic evolution of the wealths of N agents, where each agent’s
wealth wi, i = 1, ..., N, evolves according to the following first order dynamical system
w˙i(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
aij(wj − wi) + ui, wi(t = 0) = wi,0 ≥ 0. (1)
In (1) the nonnegative constants aij define the exchange parameters of the trades and the
ui’s are control terms. In general, to ensure the positivity in time of the wealth variables,
it is assumed that the exchange parameters satisfy aij < 1 for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The controls ui act in order to redistribute wealth with the aim to decrease the variance
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of wealth among agents. This can be achieved by minimizing the functional
argmin
u∈U
J(w, u) =
1
2
∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
Lj(w) + ν|uj |
2
)
dt, (2)
where U is the space of admissible controls, w = (w1, . . . , wN ), u = (u1, . . . , uN ) and Lj(w)
is a target cost functional which measures the level of wealth inequalities in the system.
An example is given by
Lj(w) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|wj − wk|
m, m ≥ 1, (3)
where for m = 2 we have a classical quadratic cost functional which corresponds to mini-
mize the variance of the wealth among all agents.
The constant ν > 0 is a selective penalization parameter which takes into account
that we may want to apply different taxation rules to different level of incomes. As we
shall discuss later on, since the control essentially acts on interactions among agents of
the system, the constant ν can be assumed to depend on the frequency of exchanges. In
this way, the control u can be understood as the external action of a government which
aims to reduce inequalities, by acting on exchanges, through wealth-dependent taxation
and redistribution among agents.
Problem (1)-(2) can be reformulated as Mayer’s problem and solved by dynamic pro-
gramming or Pontryagin’s maximum principle [20, 28]. However, the main drawback relies
on the fact that the equation for the adjoint variable has to be solved backwards in time
over the full time interval [0, T ]. In particular, for large values of N the computational
effort becomes prohibitive. Also, assuming u = A(x) where A fulfills a Riccati differential
equation cannot be pursued here due to the large dimension of A ∈ RN×N and a possi-
ble general nonlinearity in the coefficients aij (see [19]). A standard methodology, when
dealing with such complex system, is based on model predictive control where instead of
solving the control problem over the whole time horizon, the system is approximated by
an iterative solution over a sequence of finite time steps [8].
2.2 Instantaneous control
We derive a feedback control u based on a finite time horizon strategy. This feedback
control will in general only be suboptimal. Rigorous results on the properties of u for
quadratic cost functional and linear and nonlinear dynamics are available, for example, in
[8]. The receding horizon framework applied here is also called instantaneous control in
the engineering literature.
Following the approach in [3], we assume a finite time horizon ∆t ≤ 1 and in a time-
discrete setting with times tn = n∆t we consider the problem
wn+1i = w
n
i +
∆t
N
N∑
j=1
aij(w
n
j − w
n
i ) + ∆t u
n
i . (4)
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In this case we are led to minimize the cost functional
J∆t(w, u) =
1
2N
N∑
j=1
(
Lj(w
n+1) + ν|unj |
2
)
. (5)
Let us first consider the case of a quadratic cost functional, namely (3) in the case m = 2.
The necessary optimality conditions (which can be obtained by direct differentiation
with respect to uni ) yield
∆t
N2
N∑
j,k=1
(
wn+1j − w
n+1
k
)(
δij − δik
)
+
ν
N
uni = 0,
where as usual δij denotes the Kronecker delta.
Solving for the controls uni we get
uni = −
2∆t
νN
N∑
j=1
(
wn+1i − w
n+1
j
)
= −
2∆t
ν
(
wn+1i − w¯
n+1
)
, (6)
where w¯n+1 =
∑N
j=1w
n+1
j /N denotes the mean wealth of the agents at time (n + 1)∆t.
Note that the above controls satisfy the identity
N∑
i=1
uni = −
2∆t
ν
N∑
i=1
(
wn+1i − w¯
n+1
)
= 0,
which implies that all taxes are redistributed among agents.
Using the discrete dynamics (4) we finally obtain the explicit expressions
uni =−
2∆t
ν + 2∆t2

wni − w¯n + ∆tN
N∑
j=1
aij(w
n
j − w
n
i )−
∆t
N2
N∑
j,k=1
akj(w
n
j −w
n
k )

 . (7)
Expression (7) furnishes a feedback control for the fully discretized problem, which can
be plugged as an instantaneous control into (4). Note, however, that the instantaneous
control (7) in the discretized dynamics (4) is of order O(∆t). In order to obtain an effective
contribution of the control in the dynamics we will make some further natural assumptions.
First, we assume that the penalization parameter ν scales with the time discretization as
ν = 2γ∆t. This is consistent with the idea that for very short time horizons we need a
stronger control to achieve the desired goal. Second, if one agrees with the fact that a
control on wealth has to depend also on the frequency and intensity of interactions, one
is lead to assume that the parameter γ has to depend on the sum A of the exchange
parameters aij , and it is inversely proportional to A. This guarantees that, in absence of
exchanges in the system, the control on wealth looses its meaning.
In this way the instantaneous controls reads
uni =−
1
γ +∆t

wni − w¯n + ∆tN
N∑
j=1
aij(w
n
j − w
n
i )−
∆t
N2
N∑
j,k=1
akj(w
n
j − w
n
k )

 . (8)
5
In the above setting, if we assume aij = aji, the mean wealth is conserved, so that
w¯n+1 = w¯, and the minimization of the functional J∆t(w, u) corresponds to minimize the
quadratic inequality indicator
G2 =
∑N
j,k=1(wj − wk)
2
2N2w¯2
. (9)
Note that a standard indicator of wealth inequality, closely related to the one above, is
the Gini coefficient, defined as
G1 =
∑N
j,k=1 |wj − wk|
2N2w¯
. (10)
In our setting, minimization of the Gini coefficient corresponds to the cost functional (3)
for m = 1. Analogous computations show that this choice leads to the feedback control
uni = −
2∆t
νN
N∑
j=1
(wn+1i − w
n+1
j )
|wn+1i − w
n+1
j |
, (11)
where again we have
∑
i u
n
i = 0 and therefore all taxes are redistributed. In this case,
however, even using the expression of the dynamic (4) it is not possible to give an explicit
expression to the above control term. Similar conclusions are obtained for m > 2.
Remark 1 A more realistic dynamic typically includes a random part into the evolution
of the wealth system, which now reads
w˙i(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
aij(wj − wi) + ηiwi + ui, wi(t = 0) = wi,0 ≥ 0. (12)
In (12), the ηi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, denote a sequence of independent and identically distributed
random variables such that 〈ηi〉 = 0 and 〈η
2
i 〉 = σ, where 〈·〉 denotes mathematical expec-
tation. The additional random part represents risks which are always present in economic
trades [22]. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the control could act only on the
deterministic part of the evolution.
2.3 Control of binary interactions
The special case N = 2 describes binary interactions. Binary interactions are at the basis
of the kinetic description of wealth distribution in multi-agent systems [22]. In absence of
risky components we obtain
wn+1i = w
n
i +∆t a¯ij(w
n
j − w
n
i ) + ∆t u(w
n
i , w
n
j ),
(13)
wn+1j = w
n
j +∆t a¯ji(w
n
i − w
n
j ) + ∆t u(w
n
j , w
n
i ),
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where a¯ij = aij/2 for every i 6= j.
In the case of a quadratic cost functional we have
u(wni , w
n
j ) =−
1
γ +∆t
(
1
2
(wni − w
n
j ) +
∆t
2
(a¯ij + a¯ji)(w
n
j − w
n
i )
)
. (14)
Note that in the above formulation both the dynamics as well as the control functional
operate at the level of the binary interaction pair (wi, wj). Note again that the binary
dynamics preserves the local mean wealth if and only if a¯ij = a¯ji. If we now define
p = ∆t a¯ij, q = ∆t a¯ji we can write the controlled binary Boltzmann dynamics for the pair
(v,w) in the form
v∗ = v + p(w − v) + ∆t u(v,w),
w∗ = w + q(v − w) + ∆t u(w, v),
(15)
with
u(v,w) =
1
2(γ +∆t)
(1− p− q)(w − v). (16)
Collecting all terms together, and setting
β =
∆t
γ +∆t
, (17)
the binary relations (15) can be rewritten as
v∗ = v +
(
p+
β
2
(1− p− q)
)
(w − v) = v + p˜(w − v),
w∗ = w +
(
q +
β
2
(1− p− q)
)
(v − w) = w + q˜(v − w).
(18)
Hence, we observe that in the binary case the feedback control can be reformulated as a
modification of the original mixing coefficients of the binary interaction. Note that, since
by definition both p and q are less than one, and 0 < β < 1 (where β = 0 coincides with
absence of control and β = 1 yields maximum control), the new mixing coefficients p˜ and
q˜ still satisfy 0 < p˜, q˜ < 1.
It is interesting to consider the model predictive control approximation originated by
the minimization of the cost functional for m = 1 in the case of binary interactions. In
this case, in fact, assuming ν = 2γ∆t we have the implicit control definition
u(wni , w
n
j ) = −
1
2γ
(wn+1i −w
n+1
j )
|wn+1i −w
n+1
j |
. (19)
Now setting znij = w
n
i − w
n
j from the binary interaction dynamic (13) we obtain the
nonlinear equation
zn+1ij = z
n
ij(1−∆t(a¯ij − a¯ji))−∆t
zn+1ij
γ|zn+1ij |
.
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It is easy to verify that the above equation admits a solution only for
|znij | ≥
∆t
γ(1−∆t(a¯ij − a¯ji))
.
Now using the same notations as in (15) we have the explicit feedback control
u(v,w) =


−
1
2γ
, v ≥ w +
∆t
γ(1− (p− q))
,
1
2γ
, v ≤ w −
∆t
γ(1− (p− q))
,
0, otherwise.
(20)
Therefore, a fixed taxation amount is applied to the richer (and redistributed to the poorer)
of the two agents only if the difference in wealth is above a certain threshold. Note that,
the taxation process is such that v∗ ≥ 0 and w∗ ≥ 0 and that the resulting dynamic
cannot be reformulated as a modification of the original mixing coefficients of the binary
interaction as in (18).
3 Boltzmann models for wealth distribution with control
The basic model discussed in this section has been introduced in 2005 in [13] within the
framework of classical models of wealth distribution in economy, to understand the possible
formation of heavy tails, as predicted by the economic analysis of the Italian economist
Vilfredo Pareto [24]. This model belongs to a class of models in which the interacting
agents are indistinguishable. In most of these models an agent’s state at any instant of
time t ≥ 0 is completely characterized by his current wealth v ≥ 0 [16, 17]. When two
agents encounter in a trade, their pre-trade wealths v, w change into the post-trade wealths
v∗, w∗ according to the rule [11, 12]
v∗ = p1v + q1w, w
∗ = q2v + p2w.
The interaction coefficients pi and qi are non-negative random variables. While q1 denotes
the fraction of the second agent’s wealth transferred to the first agent, the difference p1−q2
is the relative gain (or loss) of wealth of the first agent due to market risks. It is usually
assumed that pi and qi have fixed laws, which are independent of v and w, and of time.
This means that the amount of wealth an agent contributes to a trade is (on the average)
proportional to the respective agent’s wealth.
3.1 The control of the Cordier-Pareschi-Toscani (CPT) model
In [13] the trade has been modelled to include the idea that wealth changes hands for
a specific reason: one agent intends to invest his wealth in some asset, property etc. in
possession of his trade partner. Typically, such investments bear some risk, and either
provide the buyer with some additional wealth, or lead to the loss of wealth in a non-
deterministic way. An easy realization of this idea consists in coupling a constant saving
8
propensity parameter [11, 12] with some risky investment that yields an immediate gain
or loss proportional to the current wealth of the investing agent
v∗ = v +
1− λ
2
(w − v) + η1v,
w∗ = w +
1− λ
2
(v − w) + η2w,
(21)
where 0 < λ < 1 is the parameter which identifies the saving propensity, namely the
intuitive behavior which prevents the agent to put in a single trade the whole amount of
his money. In this case
pi =
1 + λ
2
+ ηi, qi =
1− λ
2
(i = 1, 2).
As specified above, the coefficients η1, η2 are random parameters, which are independent
of v and w, and distributed so that always v∗, w∗ ≥ 0, i.e. η1, η2 ≥ −(1 + λ)/2.
Owing to classical arguments of kinetic theory [22], it has been shown in [13] that
the evolution of the wealth density consequent to the binary interactions (21) obeys a
Boltzmann-type equation. Let us denote with f(v, t) the distribution of the agents wealth
v ≥ 0 at time t > 0. Then, the equation for the evolution of f(v, t) can be fruitfully
written in weak form. It corresponds to say that, for any smooth function φ, f satisfies
the equation
d
dt
∫
R+
φ(v)f(v, t)dv =
1
2
〈∫
R+×R+
f(v, t)f(w, t)
(
φ(v∗) + φ(w∗)− φ(v) − φ(w)
)
dvdw
〉
. (22)
A simple computation shows that, unless the random variables are centered, i.e. 〈η1〉 =
〈η2〉 = 0, the mean wealth is not preserved, but it increases or decreases exponentially (see
the computations in [13]). For centered ηi,
〈v∗ + w∗〉 = (1 + 〈η1〉)v + (1 + 〈η2〉)w = v + w,
implying conservation of the average wealth, so that
m(f) =
∫
R+
vf(v, t) dv = m(f0).
Various specific choices for the ηi have been discussed in [21]. The easiest one leading to
interesting results is ηi = ±µ, where each sign comes with probability 1/2. The factor
µ ∈ (0, λ) should be understood as the intrinsic risk of the market: it quantifies the
fraction of wealth agents are willing to gamble on. Within this choice, one can display
the various regimes for the steady state of wealth in dependence of λ and µ, which follow
from numerical evaluation. In the zone corresponding to low market risk, the wealth
distribution shows again socialistic behavior with slim tails. Increasing the risk, one falls
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Figure 1: Parameter ranges with different tail regimes in the CPT model in the λ-µ-plane.
into capitalistic, where the wealth distribution displays the desired Pareto tail. A minimum
of saving (λ > 1/2) is necessary for this passage; this is expected since if wealth is spent
too quickly after earning, agents cannot accumulate enough to become rich. Inside the
capitalistic zone, the Pareto index decreases from +∞ at the border with socialist zone to
unity. Finally, one can obtain a steady wealth distribution which is a Dirac delta located
at zero. Both risk and saving propensity are so high that a marginal number of individuals
manages to monopolize all of the society’s wealth. In the long-time limit, these few agents
become infinitely rich, leaving all other agents truly pauper. One obtains four zones as
depicted in Figure 1. Note that Zone 1 is not allowed since |µ| < λ.
Using the notations of Section 2.3 we can solve the control problem for the CPT-model
with risk
v∗∗ = v + p(w − v) + ∆t u(v,w) + ∆t η1v,
w∗∗ = w + q(v − w) + ∆t u(w, v) + ∆t η2w,
(23)
where
p = q = ∆t
1− λ
2
= α(1− λ), α =
∆t
2
. (24)
In the case of a quadratic cost functional we obtain as feedback control on the deterministic
part the value
u(v,w) =
β
4α
(1− 2α(1 − λ)) (w − v). (25)
Consequently the post-control interaction (18) has deterministic interaction coefficients
p˜ = α(1− λ) +
β
2
(1− 2α(1 − λ)) =
β
2
+ α(1 − λ)(1 − β). (26)
Finally, if we assume ∆t = 1 (α = 1/2), we can write the controlled binary interactions
v∗∗ = v +
(
1− λ(1− β)
2
)
(w − v) + η1v,
w∗∗ = w +
(
1− λ(1− β)
2
)
(v − w) + η2w,
(27)
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Figure 2: The different feedback controls for m = 1 (left) and m = 2 (right) for various
values of the penalization parameter β. Here α = 1/2 and λ = 1.
where now β = 1/(1 + γ). Note that negative values of the wealth are now avoided if
µ ∈ (0, λ(1 − β)) for λ(1 − β) > 1/2. This gives an upper bound for the maximum
admissible control β < 1− 1/(2λ).
In a similar way, if we consider the explicit control obtained for the cost functional (3)
for m = 1 using (17) we have for deterministic part of the CPT model
u(v,w) =


−
β
4α(1− β)
, v ≥ w +
β
(1− β)
,
β
4α(1 − β)
, v ≤ w −
β
(1− β)
,
0, otherwise.
(28)
In presence of noise positivity of the wealth is guaranteed for µ ∈ (0, λ/2) and all values
of β < 1 are admissible. It should be noted, however, that large values of β implies a
stronger control but over a smaller number of agents (see Figure 2, left).
3.2 Control and Pareto tails
The formation of stationary states and their properties have been systematically investi-
gated in [21, 16]. We briefly recall the main results. The stationary curve f∞(w) satisfies
the Pareto law with index r, provided that f∞ decays like an inverse power function for
large w,
f∞(w) ∝ w
−(r+1) as w → +∞. (29)
More precisely, f∞ has Pareto index r ∈ [1,+∞) if the moments
Ms :=
∫
R+
ws f∞(w) dw (30)
are finite for all positive s < r, and infinite for s > r. If all Ms are finite (e.g. for a Gamma
distribution), then f∞ is said to possess a slim tail.
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One studies the evolution equation for the moments
Ms(t) :=
∫
R+
ws f(w, t) dw, (31)
which is obtained by integration of (22) against φ(w) = ws,
d
dt
Ms(t) =
1
2
∫
R+×R+
〈φ(v∗) + φ(w∗)〉f(v, t)f(w, t) dv dw −Ms(t) =: Q+[φ]−Ms(t). (32)
Using an elementary inequality for x, y ≥ 0, s ≥ 1,
xs + ys ≤ (x+ y)s ≤ xs + ys + 2s−1(xys−1 + xs−1y), (33)
one calculates for the right-hand side of (32)
S(s)Ms(t) ≤ Q+[φ]−Ms(t) ≤ S(s)Ms(t) + 2
s−2
2∑
i=1
〈piq
s−1
i + p
s−1
i qi〉MM
1−1/s
s (t), (34)
where S is the characteristic function given by
S(s) =
1
2
( 2∑
i=1
〈psi + q
s
i 〉
)
− 1. (35)
Solving (32) with (34), one finds that either Ms(t) remains bounded for all times when
S(s) < 0, or it diverges like exp[tS(s)] when S(s) > 0, respectively.
The function S is convex in s > 0 and S(0) = 1. It has a trivial root in s = 1 (due
to the conservation in the mean property). It may have another non-trivial root, either in
(1,∞) or in (0, 1). There are three distinct cases: (i) If s = 1 is the only root and S(s) < 0
for all s > 1, then all moments are bounded, and the steady state distribution has an
exponential tail; (ii) if a non-trivial root s = r in (1,∞) exists, moments up to the r-th
moment are bounded and the steady state distribution has a Pareto tail; (iii) if S(r) = 0
for some 0 < r < 1, then f∞(w) = δ0(w), a Dirac at w = 0. For further details, we refer
to [21, 16], we also refer to [15] for more complicated wealth-condensed distributions [15].
We now illustrate the effect of the instantaneous control in the quadratic case (25) on
the formation of the Pareto tail. Figure 3 shows the effect of the control on the formation
of tails in the CPT model for different parameters λ and µ.
The left plot shows the uncontrolled case. It is obtained by numerical evaluation of
the characteristic function S. In Zone II, s = 1 is the only root and S(s) < 0 for all s > 1,
hence all moments are bounded, and the steady state distribution has an exponential tail.
In Zone III, a non-trivial root s = r in (1,∞) exists, and moments up to the rth moment
are bounded, i.e. the steady state distribution has a Pareto tail. The color coding in Zone
III indicates the increasing Pareto tail index, increasing from darker blue (r close to one)
to lighter blue as r increases and to yellow as r → ∞. In Zone IV, there is a non-trivial
root in (0, 1), and condensation occurs: the steady state is a delta distribution at zero.
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Figure 3: Different tail regimes in the CPT model in the λ-µ-plane for the uncontrolled
(β = 0, left) and controlled (quadratic cost functional, β = 0.06, right) case. The color
coding in Zone III indicates the increasing Pareto tail index, increasing from darker blue
(r close to one) to lighter blue as r increases and to yellow as r →∞. Dashed green curves
in the right plot indicate the position of the contours for the uncontrolled case (β = 0) for
comparison.
We can similarly consider the controlled case, and numerically evaluate the character-
istic function with modified mixing parameters. The right plot in Figure 3 shows the effect
of the control. As the control is applied the region with slim tails (Zone II) is enlarged,
while the zone with Pareto tails (Zone III) is shifted towards the condensation zone (Zone
IV). The dashed green curves indicate the position of the contours in the uncontrolled
case for comparison.
4 Quasi invariant limits
4.1 Controlled limit Fokker–Planck equation
The analysis of [21] essentially shows that the microscopic interaction (21) considered in
[13] is such that the kinetic equation (22) is able to describe all interesting behaviours of
wealth distribution in a multiagent society.
By assuming
1− λ
2
= ελ0, 〈η
2
i 〉 = εσ, τ = εt, (36)
and a unitary average value of the initial density, it has been shown in [13] that the scaled
density h(v, τ) = f(v, t) satisfies in the limit ε→ 0 the Fokker–Planck equation
∂h
∂τ
=
σ
2
∂2
∂v2
(
v2h
)
+ λ0
∂
∂v
((v − 1)h) . (37)
It is immediately recognizable that equation (37) has a unique stationary solution of unit
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mass, given by the Γ-like distribution [7, 13]
h∞(v) =
(r − 1)r
Γ(r)
exp
(
− r−1v
)
v1+r
, (38)
where
r = 1 + 2
λ0
σ
> 1.
This stationary distribution exhibits a power-law tail for large values of the wealth variable.
The limit procedure induced by the scaling (36), called quasi-invariant limit of the
kinetic equation (22), corresponds to the situation in which are prevalent the exchanges of
wealth which produce an extremely small modification the pre-interaction wealths (grazing
interactions), but we are waiting enough time to still see the effects.
By using the same scaling in the controlled interactions (23) for ∆t = 1, we formally
obtain in the limit ε→ 0 the Fokker–Planck equation
∂h
∂τ
=
σ
2
∂2
∂v2
(
v2h
)
+ λ0
∂
∂v
((v − 1)h) +
∂
∂v
(U [h]h) , (39)
where
U [h](v, τ) =
∫
R+
h(w, τ)u0(v,w) dw, (40)
and u0(v,w) is the limiting value of the scaled control.
More precisely, by further assuming β = νε, in the quadratic cost case we have
u0(v,w) =
ν
2
(v − w), (41)
which gives U [h](v, τ) = ν(v − 1)/2. Clearly, we obtain the same Fokker-Planck equation
(37) where now λ0 is replaced by
λ1 = λ0 + ν/2. (42)
Since the variance of the steady state is decreasing with respect to λ,
V (h∞) =
σ
2λ0 − σ
,
whenever λ1 > λ0 in terms of variance the control improves the distribution of wealth
towards equality.
At variance, a control based on minimizing the Gini functional for m = 1 leads to
u0(v,w) =


2ν, v ≥ w + ν,
−2ν, v ≤ w − ν,
0, otherwise.
(43)
In this latter case, however, the limiting equation has a different structure with respect to
(37) and we cannot compute explicitly the steady state.
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4.2 Taxation-redistribution and limit Fokker–Planck equation
The CPT model with taxation and redistribution has been proposed in [6]. There, taxation
was acting on interactions (21) to take away a percentage δ of the trade wealth, to give
v′ = v(1− δ) +
1− λ
2
(w − v) + η1v,
w′ = w(1 − δ) +
1− λ
2
(v − w) + η2w.
(44)
Then, the wealth taken away was redistributed according to some redistribution policy,
given by a redistribution operator of the form
Rδχ(f)(v, t) = δ
∂
∂v
[
(χv − (χ+ 1)m(t)) f(v, t)
]
. (45)
Here, m(t) denotes the first moment of f , which, in general, makes the operator Rδχ
nonlinear. Hence, in presence of taxation and redistribution, the weak form of the CPT-
model takes the form
d
dτ
∫
R+
φ(v)f(v, τ)dv = δ
∫
R+
φ(v)Rδχ(f)(v, t) dv
+
1
2
〈∫
R+×R+
f(v, τ)f(w, τ)
(
φ(v′) + φ(w′)− φ(v) − φ(w)
)
dvdw
〉
. (46)
Note that, by construction, the mean wealth in the system is preserved by equation (46).
The weight factor multiplying the distribution function inside the square brackets in
(45) has been taken to be linear in v for simplicity, also in order to involve in the mechanism
only the most meaningful moments, those of order zero and one. Such a weight function
contains only one disposable real parameter χ, a constant that characterizes the type of
redistribution, and that determines the slope of the straight line as well as the value of
v, whether physical or non-physical, at which the weight itself vanishes. For χ > 0 the
redistribution acts in order to reduce inequalities proportionally to the distance from the
mean wealth m(t). The other parameter has been determined by the constraint that the
redistribution operator preserves the number of agents and actually redistributes the total
amount of money that is being collected by taxation. Further details on the redistribution
operator can be found in [6, 22].
In a very recent paper [5] the quasi-invariant limit of the kinetic equation (46) has been
considered under the same scaling (36), by further assuming that δ = κε. The resulting
Fokker–Planck equation is now
∂h
∂τ
=
σ
2
∂2
∂v2
(
v2h
)
+ λ2
∂
∂v
((v − 1)h) , (47)
λ2 = λ0 + κ(χ+ 1). (48)
Note that λ2 > λ0 whenever χ > −1. In this case, the effect of the taxation and redistri-
bution is to improve the distribution of wealth towards equality.
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In the case of a quadratic cost functional, apart from the different meaning of the
parameters appearing in (42) and (48), both control and taxation with redistribution have
the same effect on the quasi-invariant limit of the CPT model, namely to increase the
value of the coefficient of the drift operator in the resulting Fokker–Planck equation, thus
giving a stationary distribution with smaller variance with respect to the original one.
Interestingly enough, at least at the level of the Fokker–Planck equation, the effect of the
taxation and redistribution (the constant λ2) can be obtained by an instantaneous optimal
control of the binary interaction simply imposing that the penalization is chosen to give
λ1 = λ2. This gives the identity
ν = 2κ(1 + χ). (49)
From this point of view, the conjecture by Piketty [26] is verified at the level of this simple
kinetic model.
5 A numerical comparison
In this section we first compare the effects of the different control mechanisms induced by
different cost functionals in our feedback controlled kinetic models and then analyze the
behavior of the kinetic model with local control originated by a quadratic cost functional
with the kinetic model based on a global redistribution mechanism. All models have been
solved using a direct Monte Carlo simulation method (see [22] for more details). The noise
term has been taken as ηi = ±µ, where each sign comes with probability 1/2. Therefore,
we have 〈η2i 〉 = µ
2 in (36). The number of simulated sample agents has been fixed to
N = 5× 104 and standard averaging procedures have been used after the steady state has
been reached to reduce the statistical fluctuations.
5.1 Test 1. The effects of different feedback controls
First we compare the effects of the different control induced by the choice of the cost
functional in (3). More precisely we compare the controlled kinetic model (cCPT) defined
by (23) where the feedback control is defined by (25) for m = 2 and by (28) for m = 1.
We fix the strength of noise µ = 0.25 and select λ = 0.95. With these choices we are in the
power law asymptotic region of the CPT model (see Figure 1). The maximum admissible
control value for β is about 0.47 for m = 2. Initially each sample agent has a wealth
w = 1 so that f0(w) = δ(1). The results are reported in Figure 4 for β = 0.2 and β = 0.4.
Both controls mechanisms provide a marked reduction of inequalities in the system, in
particular the reduction of the Pareto index in the power law tail is proportional to the
penalization term β and comparable in the two models (see Figure 4, left). On the other
hand, the effects of the different controls processes are clearly evident for lower values of
the wealth. Increasing β for m = 1 implies a taxation/redistribution process for larger
differences in wealth (accordingly to Figure 2) which as a results gives less opportunities
for agents with low wealth values to benefit of the inequality reduction process.
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Figure 4: Test 1. Behavior of the controlled (cCPT) model in the case m = 1 and m = 2
for various values of β. Here µ = 0.25 and λ = 0.95. Asymptotic behavior of the solution
in loglog scale (left) and corresponding Lorentz curves (right).
Next, to emphasize the reduction of wealth inequality in the same Figure (right) we
have also plotted the Lorentz curve defined as
L(F (w)) =
∫ w
0
f∞(v)v dv, F (w) =
∫ w
0
f∞(v) dv,
since we have
∫∞
0 f
∞(v)v dv = 1. The Gini coefficient G1 in (10) can then be thought of
as the ratio of the area that lies between the line of equality (the line y = x of perfect
equality) and the Lorenz curve over the total area under the line of equality. In our test
case we have a value of G1 ≈ 0.46 in the uncontrolled case. For β = 0.2 it is quite evident
that the feedback control with m = 1 yields a stronger reduction of the Gini coefficient
(G1 ≈ 0.3 for m = 2 and G1 ≈ 0.28 for m = 1), whereas for β = 0.4 the two control gives
analogous results (G1 ≈ 0.25 for both models).
5.2 Test 2. Local control and global redistribution
Next we compare the kinetic model obtained by minimization of a quadratic cost functional
defined by (27) with the corresponding model based on a global taxation/redistribution
process in (44)-(45). The simulation is performed in the quasi-invariant scaling defined by
(36) together with the further scaling β = νε and δ = κε. In all test cases, the parameters
in the two models are related by assumption (49) so that in the limit ε→ 0 their solution
should coincide. We report the results obtained with the different models for various
values of the scaling parameter ε. In this way for ε = O(1) we can emphasize the different
behavior of the local control when compared to a global redistribution policy, whereas
for ε ≪ 1 we can verify the asymptotic procedure that lead to the same Fokker-Planck
equation.
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Figure 5: Test 2. Behavior of the controlled (cCPT) for m = 2 and redistributed (rCPT)
models for various values of β. Here µ = 0.25, λ = 0.95, δ = λβ/2, χ = 0. Asymptotic
behavior of the solution in loglog scale (left) and corresponding Lorentz curves (right).
The ε = O(1) regime. In the first test case we compare the controlled (cCPT) model
for m = 2 and the redistributed (rCPT) model in absence of scaling, or equivalently taking
ε = 1. We set µ = 0.25 and λ = 0.95 as in Test 1 and the same initial data. For the
redistributed model we fix δ = λβ/2, so that the taxation process of the two models is
the same in each binary interaction, and choose χ = 0 so that the redistribution process
is independent from the wealth.
As expected, with these choices the two models show a rather similar behavior. The
results of the corresponding stationary solutions are reported in Figure 5 (left) for β =
0, 0.15 and 0.3. The different slopes of the tails clearly show how both models are capable
to reduce the inequalities in the wealth distribution. Note that the models behavior is
different for small values of the wealth, since in the redistributed model the density of
agents with wealth below δ is exactly equal to zero. In Figure 5 (right) we report the
corresponding Lorentz curves.
The limit ε → 0. Finally, we consider the scaling process that leads from the kinetic
Boltzmann models to their corresponding Fokker-Planck descriptions (39) and (47). We
consider the same data as before but for a fixed value of β = 0.15 and various values of
the scaling parameter ε = 0.1 and 0.01. For this choice of parameters in the limit ε → 0
we obtain a Pareto index r = 1.8 in the uncontrolled case and r = 4.2 in the controlled
case with β = 0.15.
The results are reported in Figure 6. Since for large values of the wealth the two models
give very similar results and show the same power law behavior of the limit Fokker-Planck
model, to remark the differences we considered a region of the density function close to
the left boundary w = 0. The convergence of the models towards the analytic steady state
of the Fokker-Planck model is evident.
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Figure 6: Test 2. Scaling limit of the controlled (cCPT) for m = 2 and redistributed
(rCPT) models for various values of ε. Here µ = 0.25, λ = 0.95, β = 0.15, δ = λβ/2,
χ = 0. Asymptotic behavior of the solution in loglog scale for small values of the wealth.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a possible alternative to the standard taxation and redistri-
bution rules, which relies in a suitable control applied to the microscopic trades describing
the wealth distribution of a multi-agent system. The constrained system is then approxi-
mated by a finite time horizon strategy which allows to embed explicitly the control in the
interaction rules. We emphasize that the resulting form of the control is closely related
to the choice of the cost functional. Different cost functionals originate different taxa-
tion/redistribution strategies. We analyze in details the case of a cost functionals which
aims at minimizing the variance of the wealth distribution and the case of a cost functional
which minimizes the well-known Gini indicator. The corresponding kinetic models based
on binary interactions can then be derived and show that the control is able to modify the
corresponding Pareto tails. This can be further analyzed with the aid of some numerical
simulations by considering the corresponding quasi-invariant Fokker-Planck limit and its
relationship with previous models based on global taxation and redistribution.
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